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Y~IMIZING MODEL OF GOVERNMENT 
By 
Peter -J. Saunders 
EC.aNOMIC CHOICES UNDER THE REVENUE-MAXIMIZING 
MODEL OF GOVERNMENT 
by 
Peter J. Saunders 
Economic issues often dominate the election debates. The voters 
are urged to choose between seemingly opposing economic policies with 
supposedly different outcomes. The purpose of this note is to criti-
cally examine the validity of the very basic concept of voters' economic 
choice. For this purpose, two radically opposed models of government 
are developed and presented. The electorates, economic choices, and the 
outcomes within ea,ch model are outlined. The theoreti ,cal foundations of 
each model are examined within the confines of re,cent economic policies. 
The conclusion delineates several suggestions aimed at improving our 
existing political and economic system. 
The traditional model of government as developed in public 
finance 1 iterature ass-urnes that the main economic function of the gov-
ernment is to provide certain social goods that the private sector fails 
t -d 1 o prov, e. These social goods are desirable supposedly due to the 
substantial external benefits associated with their provision and con-
sumption. The so-called "market failure" provides the raison d'etre for 
many of our government's economic functions. By the same token, it 
justifies taxation. Within this model, the main purpose of elected 
government officials and bur,eaucrats is to "act in the public interest" 
and to wisely spend tax revenu~s on goods and services demanded by 
taxpayers. In this sense, the decision makers are assumed to a·ct in a 
manner similar to Plato's philosopher kings. That is >to say, their main 
motivation is to further the public interest rather than their own 
interest. Realizing this, the taxpayers willingly surrender part of 
thei r income for the fu rthera,nce of "the pub 1 i c good." Th is mode 1 is 
developed in much more detail in most of the conventional economic 
1 i terature. Its economic foundations can be found ;n the works of many 
prominent economists of our time. 2 
2 
An alternative to the standard model of government can be found 
in the monopoly revenue-maximizing model of government developed by 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980). The underlying feature of this model is 
the assertion that following the constitutional establishment, the gov-
ernment pursues its own objectives, frequently at variance with the 
objectives of the taxpayers. In this sense, the government is visual-
ized as the revenue-maximizing monopolist. The provision of social 
goods is only accidental and is undertaken to merely justify taxation. 
In this model, the decision makers are portrayed as rationally behaving 
economic individuals. Their primary motive is to maximize their own 
utility. This utility or satisfaction is derived from their politically 
e~ected position. In order to secure this position, the politician must 
secure voter approval at the next election. This requires supporting 
popular economic policies, such as increasing expenditures on social 
programs, cutting taxes, balancing the federal budget, and many more 
h l ·· 3 s uc po, c , e s . At the same time, the utility-maximizing behavior 
requires that the position from which utility is derived be preserved in 
the future. This requires that the actual size of government is not 
only to be maintained but pr.eferably increased. 4 The nonsation assump-
tion of the conventional utility theory makes the above statement self-
exp 1 ana tory • Consequently, the decision makers, acting as a group of 
utility-maximizing individuals, pursue the objective of revenue maxi-
mization for the government as a whole. The natural outcome of this 
model is continuous and uninterrupted governmental growth. The ·decision 
makers are no ~onger assumed to act in the public interest. Instead of 
the philosopher-kings, they resemble Smith's (1776) self-interest moti-
vated individuals pursuing strictly their own individual objectives. In 
Smith's example, the competitive markets impose natural restraints on 
· ! 3 
the selfish behavior of individuals. Unfortunately, in the monopoly 
model of government, no such natural constraints €xist. 
The above-described monopoly revenue-maximizing model of the 
government predicts several outcomes. One of its most important predic-
tions concerns the growth of the public sector. The size of this sector 
is expected to grow irrespective of the political party in power. This 
is so because the differences in political ideology do not override the 
basic individuals' objectives of the utility maximization and the com-
bined governmental objective of the revenue maximization. Consequently, 
irrespective of the pr,e-e1ection set of economic policies offered by the 
competing political parties, and irrespective of the election outcome, 
\to'e shou 1 d observe an increase in th_e abso 1 ute size of government in the 
post-election period. This assertion is supported by the findings 
illustrated in Table 1. It appears that during the last three adminis-
trations, not only have federal budget outlays grown at an increasing 
rate, but so has the gross federal debt. This result is especially 
interesting for the last three years of President Reagan's administra-
tion. During this time, the increase in the growth rate of both the 
federal budget outlays and the gross federal debt has been by far the 
greatest. This overall growth has occurred despite candidate Reagan's 
s01emn promis~ to cut the size of government. 
The revenue-maximizing monopoly model of government also postu-
1ates a definite type of tax strategy. The government's tax strategy 
must be directly related to the revenue-maximizing objective. This 
strategy involv.es redefining taxes, broadening the tax base, defining 
more comprehensively taxable income, imposing commodity taxes at dis-
criminatory rates, and many similar such policies. The evidence .of this 
TABLE 1. Federal Government Finances, 1972-1983. 
Political Federal Social Security 
Party Federal Budget Gross Gross Federal Federal Medicare, Health, 
in Power Budget Outlays as Federal Debt as Budget & Income Security 
Year (President) GNP Outlays % of GNP Debt % of GNP Deficits Expenditures 
1972 Republican 1185.9 230. 7 19 437.3 37 -23.4 80.0 
1973 " 1326.4 245.6 19 468.4 35 -14.9 90.4 
1974 " 1434.2 267.9 19 486.2 34 -6. 1 104.8 
1975 " 1 549. 2 324.2 21 544. 1 35 -53.2 134.3 
1976 Democrat 1718.0 364.5 21 631.9 37 -73. 7 158.9 
1977 " 1918.3 400.5 21 709. 1 37 -53.6 174.5 
1978 11 2163.9 448.4 21 780.4 36 -59.2 187.4 
1979 11 2417.8 491.0 20 833.8 34 -40.2 207.1 
1980 Republican 2631.7 576. 7 22 914.3 35 -73.8 248.3 
1981 11 2954. 1 657.2 19 1003.9 34 -78.9 291. 1 
1982 " 3073.0 728.4 24 1147.0 37 -127.9 322.4 
1983 " 3310.8 796.0 24 1381. 9 42 -207.8 361.7 
SOURCE: Economic Indicators. 
Note: All figures reported in billions of dollars. 
.,. 
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type of tax behavior by our government is overwhelming. It can be 
found, for instance, in frequent revisions of the tax code and in con-
tinuous efforts by the policymakers to increase taxes. 5 Of course, a 
reelection-minded politician cannot openly support direct tax increases. 
Instead, he/she is most likely to opt for decreasing visible taxes while 
increasing the invisible ones. Such behavior would manifest itself, for 
example, in voting for personal income tax cuts (decreasing direct 
taxes) while supporting the repeal of the personal income tax indexation 
law (increasing indirect tax,es). The end result of such behavior would 
undoubtedly be an increase in the federal government revenues and not 
their decrease. Tables 2 and 3 support the above-developed theory. 
Table 2 clearly s-hows that the percentage of personal income available 
to nontransfer payment recipients has been steadily declining over the 
last several decades. A decline of available income from 78 percent in 
1960 to a little over 65 percent in 1983 shows a drastic decrease in the 
purchasing power of working Americans. It is clearly evident that real 
median family incomes fell considerably between 1971 and 1981. This 
result can be directly contributed to the effect of direct federal taxes 
and inflation. 
exists a winner. 
Basi~ economic law tells us that for every loser there 
In our case, the U. S. government is the clear winner 
and the revenue-maximizing theory is supported by the available facts. 
This conclusion is supported by Table 3. 
Further evidence of the revenue-maximizing tax strategy of our 
90vernment is plentiful. For example, discriminatory tax rates are 
imposed on different commodities depending on their price elasticities 
of demand. Typically, commodities whose demand is relatively price 
inelastic are taxed at higher rates. Commodities like cigarettes and 
TABLE 2. Percentage of personal income available to nontransfer pay-
ment recipients, 1960-1980 
1983 (First 
6 
Half at Annual 
Year 1960 1970 1980 Rate) 
Personal Income $400 $801 $2165 $2700 
Minus: 
Personal taxes 50 115 337 407 
Pensions, we 1 fare, 
social se-cu ri ty, and 
persona 1 soc i a 1 
security payments 38 108 387 '522 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Available Income $312 $578 $1441 $1771 
(for nontransfer ~ayment recipients) 
% of Personal Income 78% 72% 66.5% 65.6% 
SOURCE: Pres i dent's Pri vate S,ector Survey on Cos t Contro 1. 
Note: All figures r€p.orted are in billions of dollars. 
TABLE 3. Median family incomes before and after direct federal taxes and inflation, 1971-
1981 
~'" i 
Di.rect F edera 1 Taxes Aft~-Tax Income 
Median 
Family Inco~e Social Current 1971 
Year a Security Total Dollars Dollars c Income Tax 
1971 $10,314 $ 933 $ 406 $1,339 $ 8,975 $8,975 
1972 11 , 1 52 982 468 1,450 9,702 9,392 
1973 11,895 1,098 632 1,730 10,165 9,264 
1974 13,004 1,267 761 2,028 10,976 9,014 
1975 14,156 1 , 172 825 1,997 12,159 9, 149 
1976 15,016 1,388 878 2,266 12,750 9,071 
1977 15,949 1,466 933 2,399 13,550 9,056 
1978 17,318 1,717 1,048 2, 765 14,553 9,034 
1979 19,097d 1,876 1 , 171 3,047 16,050 8,955 1980 20,900d 2,197 1,281 3,478 17,422 8,563 1981 23, 700 2,801 c 1,576 4,377 19,323 8,548 
-- ---- --_ .. __ .. - - - - --- ~- ---"-- ~-
SOURCE: J. T. Bennett, and T. J. Dilorenzo, 1983, Underground Government: The Off-Budget 
Public Sector, p. 21. (Taken from Tax Foundation, Monthly Tax Features, June-July 
1981.) 
aMedian income for all families with one earher employed full-time, year-round. 
bMarried couple filing joint return, two children. 
CAdjusted by Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
d1980 and 1981 estimated by Tax Foundation. 
eAssumes no change in current law. 
-..J 
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liquor belong to this category. Discriminatory taxes are justified by 
an appeal to the neutrality principle of taxation as well as to the 
merit argument. However, the end result of tax rate discrimination is 
similar to the outcome of price discrimination in monopoly markets; 
i.e., revenue maximization in the case of monopolistic government and 
the profit maximization in the case of monopoly in the ~roduct markets. 
As far as i ncreas i ng the sourc·es of taxes and broadeni ng the tax 
base are concerned, three recent tax changes can a-dequately illustrate 
this point. Most of us still remember the April 1983 imposition of the 
5t per gallon gasoline tax. Of course, it was not a tax increase, 
merely an imposition of a "user" fee. After all, since this "user fee" 
was imposed in "the public interest" and was to be of only a "temporary 
-duration" one could hardly accuse the politicians of revenue-maximizing 
behavior, or could one? The effort to broaden the tax base was recently 
successful, as evident by the 1983 social security legislation. The 
social security crisis was "solved" by increasing both the tax rate and 
the tax base. This solution .involved including, or perhaps better put 
~oercing, more workers into the system. Yet another political effort 
currently under way is the inclusion of employee fringe benefits in the 
definition of taxable income. Clearly, the decision makers act exactly 
in the manner pred i·cted by the monopo 1 y mode 1 of government. 
Perhaps the best example of the revenue-maximizing behavior by 
the government is President Reagan's blatant disregard of voter wishes 
concerning the federal budget deficit and expenditure reductions. 
Undoubtedly, promises to reduce the federal government's expenditures 
and eliminate its deficits were crucial to candidate Reagan's 1980 
election efforts. The present expenditure and deficit situation, as 
9 
illustrated in table 1, speaks for itself. Instead decreasing expendi-
tures and reducing deficits, both expenditures and deficits increased, a 
result predicted by the monopoly theory of government. However, this 
model allows for the possibi 1 ity of el iminatin·g deficits, not through 
decreasing expenditures but by increasing taxes. The present tax ini-
tiative by both political parties is yet another confirmation of the 
un fortunate 1 y accu rate p red i ct i v-e power of the monopo 1 y government 
model. 6 
Whenever the revenue-maximizing government is faced with pre-
election pledges involving visible tax decreases, such as was the case 
with President Reagan in 1980, the second-best strat.egy must be adopted. 
This strategy may mean temporarily (in the short run) abandoning the 
revenue-maximizing objective. Instead, the government in power may try 
to concentrate its efforts on increasing the size of the public sector. 
This policy would undoubtedly involve increasing governmental outlays 
irrespective of the tax revenues generated. Any such policy would of 
necessity result in continuously €scalating federal , budget deficits as 
well as in real increases in the federal budget outlays. Both of these 
outcomes are cl€arly illustrated in Table 1. The a~ove-described devia-
tion from the revenue-maximizing objective is unlikely to remain perma-
nently. Instead, faced with large deficits, policymakers are likely to 
ta'ke measures necessary to reduce the -clefi ci t and to ba 1 ance the budget. 
The revenue-maximizing theory ~f the government dictates that these 
measures involve tax increases not expenditure decreases. Hence, in the 
long run, the revenu-e-max;mizing objective is upheld. 7 The inevitable 
tax increases are justified by an appeal for the reduction of deficits. 
Proponents of the standard model of government will undoubtedly 
argue that increases in government expenditures are simply the result of 
an ever-increasing demand for social goods. Many 






revolves around the elimination of poverty in this .country. After all, 
who could reasonably argue against this noble objective? And who could 
be better suited for ,this task than a benevolent government? Unfortu-
nately, even this argument holds little validity. For if the decision 
makers behave in a mann.er characterized by the revenue-maximizing model 
of government, the objective of poverty elimination is unlikely to ever 
be achieved irrespective of the amount of tax revenues spent. Instead, 
w,e shou 1 d observe the creat ion and the subsequent growth of the we 1 fare 
bureaucracy. Such an out~ome i$ very likely under the constraints 
facing the decision makers. Since tax revenues cannot be directly 
appropriated, the second-best option requires the creation of the wel-
fare bureaucracy. In this manner, the bulk of the tax revenues can be 
spent on administering welfare programs. 8 Substantial salaries and 
subsequent large pensions are generated for the administrators of wel-
fare programs. Therefore, the objective of the elimination of poverty 
is unli~ely to ever be accomplished. The expenditure policies of recent 
y.ears confirm the above-outlined analysis. Table 1 illustrates ever-
increasing levels of fecleral government expenditures on social security, 
medicare, health, and income security. In spite of the vast amounts 
spent on the elimination of poverty, this objective is today as elusive 
as ever. 
A natural extension of the monopolistiC model of the government 
is to outline some future predictions. These predictions can be divided 
into two categories: a set of election promises of both major political 
parties to be expected during the election campaign; and a prediction 
11 
concerning the post-election behavior of the victor. Within the first 
set, the voters ~an expect solemn pledges concerning the deficit elimi-
nation, reduction in taxation, and undoubt.edly promises to reduce unem-
ployment, among others. In th.e post-.election period, we will most 
likely observe a sharp increase in taxes and an accelerated inflation 
rate. It also ;s very likely that the individual tax bracket indexation 
law will be repealed bef~re its scheduled implementation in 1985. After 
all, inflation tax is a perfect way of raising revenues without voter 
consent and, in most cases, without voters ever being aware of the 
effects of this sort of hidden taxation. 
It appears from the above discussion that the voters face no real 
economtc choices in general elections. Irrespective of which political 
party wins, the essential out-come of an ever-increasing governmental 
bureaucracy and taxation is inevitable. Perhaps the on 1 y choice whi ch 
can be made along party political lines is to decide who gets to be 
taxed relativ.ely more heavily and who gets most of the trickle of the 
social goods and benefits. In this light, it may make some sense to 
vote according to one's own economic standing. However, the voters 
should not expect economic miracl~s resulting out of a political elec-
tion process. The -common bel ief that all we have to do is to elect the 
"right sort of politicians" to s-olve all our economic ills is at best 
naive and in practice totally unsupported. If the voters truly desire a 
decrease in the actual size of the government and a substantial relief 
from the prohibitive taxation, then replacing existing politicians every 
four years is not the answer. Instead, the efforts should be directed 
towards curtailing the government's power to tax. This would involve 
placing constitutional restraints on the government, involving changing 
the tax structure, the tax rates, and the tax base, to name just a few. 9 
12 
for these policies to be effective, it also would be necessary to 
restrict government expenditur.es. A simple fiscal rule limiting govern-
ment direct and indirect expenditures to a predetermined percentage of 
the GNP wou~d be very suitable for this purpose. 
13 
Notes 
1. Standard public finance literatur.e lists several causes of market 
failure. These causes include externalities, nonrural consump-
tion, nonexclusion, amon'9 others. For a detailed discussion of 
these issues, see Buchanan (1968), Mishan (1971), Browning and 
Browning (1979), and many others. 
2. The theory of social goods and its implications for the existence 
of t~e government is outlined by many economists including Mus-
grave and Musgrave (1973), Samuelson (1954), and others. 
3. Many of the above-described policies are mutually exclusive and, 
i-n that sense, i rrat i ona 1. Consequently, a rationally behaving 
and an election-seeking politician often pursues irrational eco-
nom i cpo 1 i'C i e s . 
4. Under our existing political system, the politicians and the 
bureaucrats are not allowed to directly appropriate the tax 
revenu·es. However, an alternative, and an indirect method of 
rev·enue appropriation, is readily available. This method 
involves establishing large bureaucracies to administer various 
governmental programs. Within the structure of these bureaucra-
cies, the administ~ators can award themselves large salaries and 
gen.erous pensions. Niskanen (1968) formally develops the model 
of bureaucratic behavior. Within this model, it is illustrated 
that the growth of a governmental bureau and its output far 
exceed any demand by the taxpayers. 
5. The most recent evidence of the revenue-maximizing tax behavior 
is the effort to "simplify" the tax <:ode. Feldstein (1984) 
suggests that there exists in the Congress a bipartisan consensus 
14 
to simplify t he existing income tax code. Naturally, this effort 
is supposedly under way to make our income system "fairer to 
everybody. " However, as expected under the revenue-maximizing 
model of the government, the end result would be to raise the 
government tax revenues by some $85 billion by 1989. This result 
would be achieved by imposing an essentially flat tax while at 
the same time eliminating the majority of the tax loopholes. 
6. Ibid. 
7. The distinction between the ~hort run and the long run can per-
haps be best understood in terms of the most immediate policy and 
its change at som'e 1 ater date. I n the case of the present gov-
ernment, the short-run policy of personal income tax cuts may 
we 11 be rep 1 aced by a po 1 icy of rea 1 tax increases in the second 
term of Reagan's presidency. 
8. Kondratas (1984) maintains that although some $107;5 billion was 
spent 
local 
in 1983 on major welfare programs by federal, state, 
governments, some 40 percent of the households below 
official poverty line received no welfare benefits at all. 
and 
the 
9. For a further discussion of such constitutional restraints, see 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
15 
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